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SEVENTH CIRCUIT COMES TO ARBITRATOR’S DEFENSE IN 
CLARIFYING NARROW SCOPE OF ARBITRATOR ‘EVIDENT 
PARTIALITY’ UNDER SECTION 10 OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
ACT 
 
Mallary Willatt * 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Trustmark Insurance Co. v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co., the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered an appeal seeking review of an injunction barring 
the parties from further arbitration proceedings so long as a certain arbitrator remained a member 
of the arbitration panel.1 The Plaintiff-Appellee argued, and the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division agreed, that having previously arbitrated a 
dispute between the two parties over essentially the same issue, the arbitrator could no longer be 
considered disinterested in the proceedings.2 The Plaintiff-Appellee argued this partiality was due 
to the arbitrator’s preexisting knowledge of the previous arbitration and the dispute.3 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, clarifying that under §10 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”), “partiality” means only having a personal or financial stake in the outcome of the 
arbitration, and that mere knowledge of previous events or arbitrations or interest in 
reemployment by the parties is not enough to establish partiality.4 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Appellant John Hancock Life Insurance Company (“Hancock”) and Appellee Trustmark 
Insurance Company (“Trustmark”) entered into an agreement under which Trustmark would 
reinsure risks underwritten by Hancock.5 The two insurance companies later disagreed over the 
meaning of “London Market Retrocessional Excess of Loss Business” and submitted their dispute 
to arbitration under the terms of the contract.6 A three-member panel consisting of one party-
chosen arbitrator appointed by each side and a neutral umpire found in favor of Hancock in 
March 2004, and a district court later affirmed the award.7  In October 2004, Hancock 
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commenced another arbitration action after Trustmark refused to pay any of the bills Hancock 
had sent, claiming that the arbitral award alone governed all its dealings with Hancock.8 
Once the second arbitration was commenced, Trustmark argued that Hancock had only 
secured its award by fraud because it failed to disclose four documents during discovery.9 When 
picking the arbitrators for the second panel, Hancock chose Mark S. Gurevitz, (“Gurevitz”) whom 
Hancock had chosen in the initial arbitration as well.10 Trustmark chose an arbitrator who had 
been uninvolved in the prior proceeding.11 Once the arbitrators were selected, it was necessary to 
determine what weight to give the previous arbitral decision. Hancock argued the results were 
dispositive, but Trustmark contended that the proceedings should be started from scratch, and that 
the confidentiality agreement the parties had signed during the first arbitration prevented any 
disclosure of the first arbitration.12 Gurevitz and the neutral umpire agreed with Hancock, and 
concluded that they, as arbitrators, were entitled to know the evidence and results of the first 
arbitration.13 
Trustmark filed suit to vacate the initial court decision confirming the award, but having 
been filed in 2009, the suit was held to be untimely.14 Trustmark then sought an injunction to 
prevent further arbitration so long as Gurevitz remained on the panel, arguing his knowledge of 
the previous arbitration proceedings prevented him from being a disinterested party and rendered 
him partial in the outcome of the dispute.15 Under FAA §10(a) an arbitral award may be vacated 
“where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators” or “where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award 
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”16 Moreover, both the contract between 
Trustmark and Hancock and general principles of arbitration require that the arbitrators to a 
dispute be disinterested and impartial, such that the arbitrator have no financial or other personal 
stake in the outcome.17 Trustmark used this and the requirement of arbitrator impartiality and 
disinterest to argue that because of his knowledge of the first arbitration, Gurevitz was rendered 
partial and should be excluded from the proceeding because any decision he rendered would be 
open to vacatur by a district court.18 
The district court that heard Trustmark’s request for an injunction agreed, and held that 
Gurevitz was not disinterested because of his knowledge of the first arbitration.19 In addition, the 
court found that the second panel was not entitled to consider the decision made by the first, 
effectively halting the arbitration.20 Hancock then appealed the district court’s decision.21 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
The main issue for the circuit court’s review was whether the injunction was properly 
granted by the district court. An injunction, because it is a form of equitable relief, requires a 
showing of irreparable harm – a showing that Trustmark failed to meet, according to the court.22. 
The court concluded that the district court erred in finding that Trustmark had not agreed to 
arbitrate the reinsurance of certain risks, it also held that there would be no irreparable harm done 
to Trustmark by proceeding to arbitration.23 The only conceivable injury would be that of time 
and cost.24 Even if Gurevitz were later found to have been partial, Trustmark would not be 
deprived of its ability to seek vacatur of the award in court under FAA section 10, and thus would 
not have been caused any irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted.25 
The Seventh Circuit, in addition to finding a lack of the irreparable harm necessary for 
injunctive relief, also took unusual and considerable steps to clarify the meaning of “disinterested 
arbitrator.”26 “Disinterested” adjudicators, according to the Supreme Court, are merely required 
to be “lacking a financial or other personal stake in the outcome.”27 The court then held that 
Gurevitz’s knowledge of the previous arbitration did not constitute either financial or personal 
stake, but merely the same reputational stake any arbitrator has in the proceedings he or she is 
tasked with overseeing.28 Next, the court made sure to clarify that unless an arbitrator has such 
personal or financial stake in the outcome of the proceedings, he will not be disqualified from 
adjudicating on grounds of partiality or interest.29 Despite the assumption that he would rule in 
favor of the party appointing him, Gurevitz was no different than any other arbitrator, or even any 
other judge.30 Adjudicators often have knowledge of the parties or disputes, and such knowledge 
is not sufficient to disqualify them.31  In fact, as the court pointed out, the district court judge who 
issued the injunction was the very same judge who issued the order enforcing the 2004 arbitration 
award.32 Such knowledge is insufficient to disqualify either a judge or an arbitrator, as 
“knowledge acquired in a judicial [or here, arbitral] capacity does not require disqualification.”33 
The court then went on to clarify the higher burden set for disqualifying arbitrators from 
adjudicating disputes.34 While the parties involved in a suit cannot handpick judges, the rules of 
arbitration allow parties to pick their arbitrators. Additionally, under FAA §10 only “evident 
partiality”, as opposed to the risk or appearance of such partiality, is sufficient to disqualify an 
arbitrator or result in the vacatur of an arbitral award.35 The court then reasoned that where a 
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valid bargained-for contract allows the parties to choose their arbitrator, a court should not 
interfere with their ability to do so, provided all contractual requirements are followed and there 
is no other reason to disqualify the arbitrator.36 In concluding that Gurevitz’s prior knowledge of 
the first arbitration between Trustmark and Hancock was not enough to show the evident 
partiality necessary for arbitrator disqualification, the Seventh Circuit made clear the 
requirements for a showing of such evident partiality and made explicit the need for either 
personal or financial interest sufficient to render the arbitrator incapable of hearing the dispute 
with disinterest.37 The court concluded that barring a showing of such evident partiality by 
Gurevitz, no irreparable injury would befall Trustmark should an injunction not be granted and 
the parties are allowed to proceed to arbitration.38 
IV.  SIGNIFICANCE 
Trustmark is significant because the court makes explicit the requirements for arbitrator 
disqualification due to evident partiality. The Seventh Circuit signals its reluctance to divert from 
anything other than the narrowest view of what constitutes evident partiality and refuses to find it 
other than where there is a showing of personal or financial interests in the parties or disputes.39 
The court in Trustmark makes clear its deference towards arbitration and its unwillingness to 
interfere with bargained-for arbitration agreements unless a party can prove that an arbitrator’s 
disinterest would be impossible.40 In essence, the decision in Trustmark makes clear to parties 
engaged in arbitration in the Seventh Circuit that not only will it take a significant conflict to 
disqualify an arbitrator, but that the disputing sides can select an arbitrator with intimate 
knowledge of the parties’ businesses or previous arbitration proceedings without fear of 
disqualification of the arbitrator or vacatur of the eventual award.41 The court also makes certain 
that in the future all parties to arbitration will be aware of the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to 
interfere with arbitration proceedings. The decision establishes unless there is a clear case of 
abuse of discretion or arbitrator evident partiality, the Seventh Circuit will respect the arbitration 
agreement and not intrude on the bargained-for proceedings. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While the majority of the court’s decision is a fairly simple matter of determining 
whether any irreparable harm would befall Trustmark should the parties proceed to arbitration, 
the court’s decision to go further and address the question of arbitrator partiality is a significant 
step, as it was not an issue that needed to be addressed by the court.42 The court could have 
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merely concluded that Trustmark would receive no irreparable injury should a stay of arbitration 
not be granted, and left the parties to their own devices.43 Instead, the court chose to devote a 
good portion of its decision to the accusations made by Trustmark that Gurevitz was a partial 
arbitrator and should have been disqualified. The court, in forceful language, makes clear that it 
will not take the opportunity to expand the definition of arbitrator partiality and will only step in 
to disqualify an arbitrator where there is a clear case of evident partiality.44 Moreover, the court 
refuses to expand its understanding of such evident partiality, reinforcing the idea of arbitration as 
a bargained-for contract, meaning that if the parties were silent on an issue, the court should not 
be the one to step in and interpret that silence.  
In coming to defend Gurevitz’s honor, the court also continues to make clear the stark 
differences between arbitration and traditional judicial proceedings. The Seventh Circuit 
unequivocally rejects any instance where a party would seek to narrow that difference, and to 
either make arbitrators no different than judges, or to limit the amount of knowledge either could 
have about a dispute. In its decision here, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals hews closely to 
previous arbitration cases that staunchly defend the right of parties to choose arbitration, as well 
as parties’ rights to contract for exactly what they get in the resulting decision. The court here, 
instead of merely deciding the issue of whether the injunction was properly granted, takes the 
extra step in chastising a party that it thinks launched a baseless and defamatory attack against 
one of the arbitrators and makes clear its disinclination to involve the courts in arbitration where 
there is not a clear and previously established statutory or judicial reason to do so. In addition, the 
court warns other potential litigants that it will not allow attacks on arbitrator credibility to derail 
arbitration proceedings unless the litigating party can prove one of the already established 
indicators of evident partiality; that is, either personal or financial stakes that would make the 
arbitrator interested in the outcome of the proceedings and unable to impartially decide the 
outcome of the dispute. 
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